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Language policies include the ways institutions shape the linguistic structures of a 
society in general, and the claims of individual speakers or linguistic groups to change 
existing language arrangements or legislations; the ways states or institutions impose 
official language(s); manage language diversity in multilingual settings; legislate on 
inter-national linguistic rules (such as in the EU)1; and lay out preferential treatments to 
protect speakers of vulnerable language communities. Language policies are quite 
unique compared to other public policies given that linguistic disenfranchisement is 
impossible (as opposed to religious disenfranchisement for example2). Firstly because 
interactions between institutions and their members (or their would-be members, think 
of immigrants) always occur through specific languages: institutions regulate linguistic 
public rights3 and duties4, therefore linguistic hands-off policies cannot exist. Secondly 
																																																						
1  A. von Busekist “Language and Politics”, in International Encyclopedia of Political Science, B. 
Badie, D. Bergschlosser, L. Morlino ed., 8 vol., Sage, London, 2011, 2070-2072. 
2  Although some have argued that the analogy between language and religion is heuristic. Allan 
Patten for instance argues against language planning and in favor of a non-outcome oriented policy 
designed to establish “fair background conditions in which speakers of different languages can strive for 
the success and survival of their own language communities”, A. Patten, “Liberal neutrality and Language 
Policy”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31/4, 2003, 356-386, 366sq. R. Brubaker compares language 
claims to religious claims and argues that religious claims have replaced language claims in Western 
Democracies: “religion has tended to displace language as the cutting edge of contestation over the 
political accommodation of cultural difference – a striking reversal of the longer-term historical process 
through which language had previously displaced religion as the primary focus of contention.”. R. 
Brubaker, “Language, religion and the politics of difference”, Nations and Nationalism 19/1, 2013, 1–20, 
1.  
3  Institutions do not regulate private speech practices (only recognized languages generate 
individual language rights or protections for language communities), although private speech practices 
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because language is a collective good in its own reason5, primarily because states 
cannot distribute language the same way they distribute healthcare, social security or 
housing6 despite the fact that languages are important primary, social and common 
goods. But states can and do distribute “access rights” and services related to (minority) 
language issues (via instrumental or accommodationist policies)7. 
For some languages are comparable to primary social goods individuals should be 
able to enjoy in much the same way as other goods or liberties. For others language is 
culture and determines all our social interactions: language is what enables us to be 
political animals, but language is primarily a token of identification with our culture, 
large or small. True equality (of opportunities) is hence only possible if individuals have 
a significant context of choice in their own linguistic surrounding. The former look at 
the equal liberty of individual speakers (with language belonging to a of justice 
principles), the latter at communities of speakers (and the moral importance of 
belonging to a language community).  
 
This chapter aims to clarify why language policies are the substructure of a variety of 
important democratic requirements and hence why fair and ethical language policies 
matter for democratic polities. In a nutshell: without language skills, access to various 
spheres - political as well as socio-economic – is hindered. Without access to these 
spheres of citizenship, no political, social and economic rights and duties can be 
properly exercised, and no rights claims can be properly voiced. 
																																																																																																																																																																									
are revant to determine the linguistic balance within a state. The US Census is a good example of a 
comprehensive mapping of the linguistic diversity of US citizens. 
https://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/language/data/other/usernote.html 
4  Think of citizenship tests which almost always comprise a language requirement. R. Bauböck, C. 
Joppke, ed., How liberal are citizenship tests?, European University Institute, Florence, 2011.  
5  Abram de Swaan has argued that languages are non excludable “hypercollective  public goods” 
with positive network externalities. A. de Swaan, Words of the World, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001. 
6  Y. Peled, “Language, rights and the language of language rights. The need fro a conceptual 
framework in the political theory of language policy”, Journal of Language and Politics 10/3, 2011, 436-
456, 445. 
7  See for example R. Meylaerts, “Translational Justice in a Multilingual World”, Meta 56/4, 2011, 
743-757; W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2001; W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International 
Politics of Diversity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; G. González Núñez, “Translation Policy in a 
Linguistically Diverse World”, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 15/1, 2016, 1-18. 
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My general claim is that language skills are politically enabling8. Language is a 
political enabling skill meant to connect people and to interact meaningfully within 
political communities9. Language skills enable people to effectively participate in their 
polity (in the language of their polity), and beyond (in a commonly agreed upon 
language or in a lingua franca). Most scholars identify two potentially contradictory 
principles: identity-related linguistic claims, and utility- or efficiency-related linguistic 
claims as bases for ethical and democratic language policies. In my view, ethical 
language policies are the substructure and the condition of democratic requirements 
and they should be designed as respecting at once the identity-related claims and 
efficiency-related claims (participation, recognition, parity of esteem, non-domination, 
self-government). 
 
I will first briefly lay out the (divergent) normative assumptions about the political 
value of languages. They roughly revolve around two poles, concerned with identity-
related claims on the one hand, with efficiency-related claims, often sustained by 
utilitarian principles, on the other hand. Somewhere in between, the “linguistic justice” 
paradigm, most prominently defended by Philippe Van Parijs10, is an attempt to bridge 
the divisions (I). I will then show how these analyses implicitly draw on the notion of 
burden – vulnerable speakers or speech communities are burdened in asymmetrical 
language situations – without reflecting properly on the precise nature of the burden. I 
will argue that the type of burden matters, and that different assumptions about burden 
lead to different normative approaches and policy designs (II). I will conclude by 
arguing that the literature is not always clear about the political preferences that inspire 
normative prescriptions for language policies. Different types of political or moral 
desiderata (autonomy, liberty, non-domination, security, self-government, mobility, 
																																																						
8  We argue this is a systematic way applied to immigrants, see B. Boudou, A. von Busekist, 
“Language proficiency and migration: An argument against testing”, forthcoming in M. Gazzola, B.A. 
Wickström, T. Templin, Language Policy and Linguistic Justice: Economics, Philosophical and 
Sociolinguistics Approaches, Berlin, Spinger, 2017. 
9  B. Boudou, A. von Busekist, “Language proficiency and migration: An argument against testing”, 
art. cit. 
10  Van Parijs’ research, developed over 15 years, has culminated in his last book: Linguistic Justice 
for Europe and the World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011. 
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employability) call for different justifications of language policies and lead to different 
shapes of language constellations in the long run11. 
 
I. Identity and efficiency 
 
As I have pointed out above, scholars dealing with language issues are quite divided 
about the way we should publicly recognize language groups, communities and 
individual speakers. Either we value identity–related claims or utility–related claims12.  
The fact that language is a tool to connect as many people possible for some and an 
identity vector for others, or rather that there exists a hierarchy between these two 
conceptions13 involves different ethical, moral and political claims. For team one, those 
who believe that language is intrinsically linked to something precious, worth to be 
publicly defended and protected14 - our personal and political identity -, the state has a 
moral duty to accommodate this quest for (collective) recognition15. Each of us should 
have access to a significant realm of choices and opportunities within our own 
																																																						
11  Some scholars have tried to argue in favor of non-outcome oriented language policies (D. Laitin 
and R. Reich, “A Liberal Democratic Approach to Language Justice,” in Alan Patten, Will Kymlicka, ed., 
Language Rights and Political Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, 80-104), opposing, for 
example, language planning (Patten, “Liberal neutrality and Language Policy”, art. cit), but public 
policies are obviously to some degree outcome oriented. 
12  Interestingly, De Schutter and Robichaud, write identity-“interests” when referring to scholars 
who argue that identity claims matter in linguistic demands and regulations. I believe however that the 
notion of interest is a way of slightly twisting the debate by stretching the identity category beyond its 
scope. De Schutter and Robichaud indeed list a number of “identity interests” among which autonomy, 
context of choice and opportunities, self-realization, whereas non-identity interests are efficiency, 
democracy, and equality of opportunity. I fail to understand how one would have non-identity interests 
realized without prior or simultaneous realization of identity-interests. One may haggle about the way 
states ought to accommodate the genuine passion people have for their languages, but one should not 
rule them out a priori. Here is an example: a language will die if not actively kept alive by a group of 
speakers. Either the speakers are willing to sustain their language, and no one should intervene in their 
choice, or speakers wish to “abandon” the language and move on to a “bigger” one. The only thing an 
institution can do without being paternalistic is to incentivize the speakers to keep their language alive. 
See H. de Schutter, D. Robichaud, “Van Parijsian linguistic justice – context, analysis and critiques”, in 
Linguistic Justice. Van Parijs and his Critics, Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy, 18/2, 87-112. 
13  D. Laitin “What is a Language Community?”, American Journal of Political Science, 44/1, 2000, 
142-155 ; J. Pool, “The Official Language Problem”, The American Political Science Review, vol. 85/2, 
1991, 495-514; J. Pool, “The World Language Problem”, Rationality and Society, 3/1, 78-105; A. de 
Swaan, “Why is this in English?”, Schuman Lecture, Universiteit Maastricht, 2000 retrieved here: 
http://wwwdeswaan.com/engels/from_our_archives/WhyEnglish.htm 
14  D. Réaume, “Official Langueg Rights: Intrinsic Value and the Protection of Difference”, 
Kymlicka, Will Wayne Norman, ed., Citizenship in Diverse Societies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000. 
15   S. May, Language and Minority Rights. Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language (2nd 
Edition), New York/London, Routledge, 2012.  
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“societal culture” (education, employment, office). If specific cultures are different from 
the general linguistic culture (official or national language), institutions should confer 
linguistic rights to individual members of minority or vulnerable communities. Note 
that these accommodation policies, in the eyes of their most vocal proponent, Will 
Kymlicka, apply only to “historical minorities”, and not to immigrant communities16. In 
his approach, the holder of protection rights is nevertheless the individual, as it is 
assumed that her citizenship rights are dependent upon her identity as a speaker17. 
More and more scholars, although with different paths of justification and looking at 
different types of constituencies – local and communal rather than national, argue that 
immigrants should be granted the same privileges18.  
A second subset of the literature argues that language communities should be 
granted collective rights. That communities should benefit from rights related to their 
collective minority / vulnerable status. There are multiple ramifications of this thesis. 
Firstly, it is not a classical liberal take on language policies, as it is not foremost 
concerned with individuals. The idea is that one cannot remedy or rectify linguistic 
injustice (which is often a result of socio-economic inequalities, large power 
structures19) without granting collective rights (not necessarily territorialized). Here 
restorative justice mechanisms would typically compensate forceful assimilation into 
majority (often colonial) languages. Linguistic genocide, “linguicide” is the most radical 
way of framing the necessary resistance to hegemonic language policies: language is 
																																																						
16  Multinationality applies to “full societies” with a specific territory and a specific culture; 
Polyethnicity is a specific, limited in time, accommodationist policy. W. Kymlicka, Politics in the 
Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001. 
17  This is a somewhat controversial statement. But I believe the difference Kymlicka introduces 
between external protections and internal restrictions is redundant: external protections are indeed meant 
to protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority. Individual members are assumed to be rationally 
committed to protect their particular societal culture (by aggregated preference); external restrictions 
(meant to protect individual members from group pressure) on the other hand are a simple restatement of 
the generally applicable law.  
18  C. Joppke,  Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe, 
West European Politics 30/1, 2007, 1-22 ; A. Shorten, “Linguistic Competence and Citizenship 
Acquisition”, in G. Calder, P. Cole, J. Seglow ed., Citizenship Acquisition and National Belonging. 
Migration, Membership and the Liberal Democratic State, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; R. 
Rubio-Marin, “Language Rights: Exploring the Competing Rationales”, in W. Kymlicka, A. Patten, 
Language rights and political theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003; R. Meylaerts, “Translational 
Justice in a Multilingual World”, art. cit.; C. Rodriguez, Cristina M., “Language and participation”, 
California Law Review, vol. 94, n°3 (May), 2006, 687-767. 
19  Bourdieu typically argues that “school language” and “domestic language” are mutually 
unintelligible for the least endowed, hence a structural domination of those who master the right 




power, a “colonization of the minds”, Anglo-American globalization is equated with a 
human rights violation, as the most vulnerable speech communities loose on all 
accounts. They cannot learn the hegemonic language - which is also the language of 
global justice - and are therefore deprived of their rights to have their claims properly 
heard20.  
A third and related way of staging identity-related issues draws on ecology or 
environmental ethics. Linguistic diversity is considered a global public good. The fact 
that languages die every day is considered a moral loss for humanity and an injustice 
for its speakers as they are deprived of their genuine cultural relationship to their 
environment 21 . However, active language survival policies come with a price, 
comparable to the cost of protecting dying species22; and as they are often framed as an 
‘ought’, to be implemented coercively and against the will of their speakers, they seem 
quite illiberal23.  
The defense of language as a primordial sign of identity – individual and collective – 
and strong advocacy for diversity as a value conceals important problems for policy 
makers: should diversity trump mobility and employability? Democratic deliberation 
and participation? How are we to manage political problems that cut across different 
language communities while enhancing participation, applying democratic procedures, 
protecting individual rights?  
 
																																																						
20  T. Skutnabb‐Kangas, R. Phillipson, “Linguicide”, in The Encyclopedia of Language and 
Linguistics, Pergamon Press & Aberdeen University Press, 1994, 2211‐2212.   The NGO Terralingua is a 
good example of this kind of approach (languages as a bio-cultural patrimony of humanity). See 
http://www.terralingua.org/blog/2010/07/28/french/. 
21  Think of the role space and place play in our vocabulary: Inuit’s have more than 300 words for 
snow, Philippine tribes name more than 600 plants other groups have no words for. 
22  Maps overlap according to Idil Boran, “Global Linguistic Diversity, Public Goods and the 
Principle of Fairness”, in W. Kymlicka, A. Patten, ed., Language Rights and Political Theory, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2003. Language diversity is compared to the diversity of species, the theoretical 
resource is environmental ethics. Both diversities are said to be correlated for three reasons: maps of 
endangered species and languages overlap; domination of the more powerful species and languages 
endanger the more vulnerable ones; the overall benefit of protecting diversity by from saving the ones 
will save all the others. 
Contra A. de Swaan, “Endangered Languages, Sociolinguistics, and Linguistic Sentimentalism”, European 
Review, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 12/4, October 2004, 567-580. 
23  A. Musschenga, “Intrinsic value as a reason for the preservation of minority cultures”, Ethical 




These are the questions team two asks, e.g. scholars committed to efficiency. Most of 
them are consequentialists, and they rightfully believe that languages are foremost tools 
to connect people. Poetry and literature are only interesting side-effects of using (high) 
language. But tools to what end exactly? I will not go into details about script languages 
versus spoken languages, anthropologists have shown that script is foremost a tool for 
domination on a large scale but that communities without script are doomed to 
disappear24. So tools to what end? The discussion on efficiency can lead to two possible 
outcomes: lingua franca policies - in order to achieve efficient integrated political 
practices reaching constituencies beyond specific linguistic repertoires, in the EU for 
example, and in which everyone can take part: for that we need a common language -, 
or coordinated language policies: in order to achieve efficient political communication, 
we need a system of coordinating our different repertoires without necessarily choosing 
a single lingua franca. Neither is a priori incompatible with political fairness, and 
neither is necessarily hostile towards identity-related claims or the value of diversity. 
Both are compatible with either territoriality or non-territoriality 25 . Interestingly, 
although coordination games are desirable, as argued forcefully by economist François 
Grin26 for example, the proponents of coordination mostly end up defending lingua 
franca policies, although not always to the exclusion of language diversity. This is the 
case for Abram de Swaan27, Reinhard Selten, Jonathan Pool and David Laitin28. All 
argue that language communities engage in - or should engage in - a cost-benefit 
analysis with compensations, trade-offs, and “side payments” in order to evaluate what 
																																																						
24  See Cl. Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, chap. “La leçon d’écriture”, Paris, Plon, 1955 ; K. 
Wittfogel, Le despotisme oriental, Paris, Minuit, 1957; J. Goody, The Logic of Writing and the 
Organization of Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986; G. Balandier, Anthropologie 
politique, Paris, PUF, 2nd ed., 1969. 
25  I have argued elsewhere that the best rationale is to encourage the co-presence of a suitable 
lingua franca with linguistic diversity, while welcoming social multilingualism in places relevant for 
individuals and citizens, e.g. in intermediary institutions where speakers should have a high level of 
control over their own fate: schools, the workplace, neighbourhood councils, local democracy: A. von 
Busekist, “Bowling together. Lingua Franca and Social Multilingualism”, forthcoming in F. Grin, P. Kraus, 
ed., The Politics of Multilingualism: Linguistic Governance, Globalisation and Europeanisation, 
Amsterdam,  John Benjamins, 2016. 
26  The inescapable passage to English in the EU only makes sense in the absence of coordinated 
policies. F. Grin, “L'anglais comme lingua franca: questions de coût et d'équité. Commentaire sur 
l'article de Philippe Van Parijs”, Économie publique, 15/2, 2004, 33-41 ; F. Grin, “Diversity as paradigm, 
analytical device, and policy goal”, in W. Kymlicka and A. Patten (eds.), Language Rights and Political 
Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, 169-188. 
27  A. de Swaan, Words of the World, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001. 
28  R. Selten, J. Pool, “The Distribution of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium”, in R. 
Selten ed., Game Equilibrium Models, Vol. 4, Berlin, Springer, 1991, 64-87. 
Astrid	von	Busekist	The	Ethics	of	language	policies	
	 8	
they are ready to give up in exchange for being able to communicate with a larger 
group than their native community29. The rationale underlying this approach is the 
following: it is because languages are collective goods that they are at once 
instrumental for their speakers, and it is because language sharing enables a variety of 
individual usages that languages are “goods produced by coordination”. The value of 
languages is instrumental, but their utility is conceptually dependent on their utility for 
other speakers. Languages are utile for me only if they are utile for a sufficient number 
of other speakers30. The distinction Charles Taylor makes between public goods (a 
lighthouse) and other goods that are “irreducibly social” (friendship) which are valuable 
because we mutually agree that they are valuable, is a fragile distinction regarding 
languages as they possess both features: they are instrumental and are mutually 
recognized as valuable by they speakers.  
 
Another, more promising way of looking at efficiency is by asking what kind of 
political efficiency we are aiming for. Is it to support democracy, social justice, non-
domination, self-government, equal chances and opportunities? It is difficult to see 
though how these democratic goals can be separated from identity-related claims. Most 
authors simply say that there is a hierarchy between democratic politics and catering to 
identity-related claims and diversity, that they could and should be traded off against 
democratic imperatives. Language disadvantages are indeed said to be detrimental to 
democratic equality and therefore to democratic participation31; and the argument in 
																																																						
29  Budget issues (symbolic or material) are often discussed in relation to EU language policies. 
Fidrmuc, Ginsburgh, Weber argue for example that translation and transportation costs of translated 
material in the EU is excessively high and should therefore be reduced. They suggest that states use the 
EU language budget freely but invest it in language training, J. Fidrmuc, V. Ginsburgh, S. Weber, “Le 
français, deuxième langue de l’Union européenne?”,  
Économie publique, 15/2, 2004, 43-63  and V. Ginsburg, S. Weber, How Many Languages Do We Need? 
The Economics of Linguistic Diversity, New Haven, Princeton University Press, 2011. 
30  E. Lagerspetz, “« On Language Rights”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 1, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1998, 181-199. 
31  B. Barry, has argued this forcefully looking at Welsh for example, see Culture and Equality: An 
Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, London, Polity Press, 2001. D. Weinstock, argues from a similar 
perspective, although he is less severe towards minority languages, see “Can parity of self-esteem serve 
as the basis of the principle of linguistic territoriality?”, in H. de Schutter, D. Robichaud special issue 
guest ed., Linguistic Justice. Van Parijs and his Critics, Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy, 18/2, 2015, 199-211. 
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favor of common (national or supra-national) languages is usually made to foster a 
healthy participatory “talkcentric” democracy32.  
This is a pragmatic argument about the advantages of sharing a language which goes 
well with what I have said earlier: access to a common language is the substructure for 
other democratic interests. Imposing a common language may be (transitionally) 
detrimental to minority language groups, but overriding democratic interests exist in 
incentivizing the learning of a common language or common languages: employability, 
equality, autonomy and access to relevant social services are such overriding 
principles. Common language proficiency is desirable both for citizens (and 
newcomers33) as they can interact autonomously and take part in the political culture of 
the state, and for the state because it fosters cooperation and solidarity and ensures the 
sustainability of the domestic (political) culture. 
 
II. Burdens and opportunities 
 
I have so far made a distinction between identity-related claims and utility-related 
claims. Both claims are taken very seriously in the realm of linguistic justice. Linguistic 
justice is of course related to the ethics of language policies, and its most prominent 
author, Philippe Van Parijs, has dedicated his work to combining identity claims and 
efficiency claims in a fair and just manner. I will first say a few words on his theory and 
mention some objections to his model, and then show why I believe that the notion of 
burden is under conceptualized. 
 
Van Parijs argues for “cooperative linguistic justice” relying on two main principles: 
a global lingua franca (English) and coercive territorial protection for national 
languages. The two principles are of a different nature and are justified for different 
reasons: the first principle is pragmatic and presentist. It is at once rational and 
desirable to opt for English as lingua franca, and English is already our lingua franca as 
																																																						
32  J. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1990. 
33  A. Blackledge, “As a Country We Do Expect: The Further Extension of Language Testing Regimes 
in the United Kingdom”, Language Assessment Quarterly 6/1, 2009, 6-16; L. M. Kahn, “Immigration, 
Skills and the Labor Market: International Evidence. Journal of Popular Economy 17/3, 2004, 501-534. 
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a consequence of a given historical context, or, to put it otherwise: an aggregation of 
independent interests has lead to English being our global lingua franca. In other words, 
we should choose a language that is already imposed on us without our explicit 
consent. In order to justify this state of affairs, we need to actively encourage English for 
our own best interest and for the sake of democracy. This is our “duty” in Van Parijs’ 
words34: in order to communicate across borders and despite linguistic diversity we 
need a common ground (language) so that a violation of rights in one place is now felt 
throughout the world as Kant would put it. The means to achieve this are quite simple: 
we need to equalize the cost-benefit ratio of learning languages35. Van Parijs is aware 
that Anglophones benefitting from their “mother-tongue blessing” will not pay (via 
taxes) for the language training of non native English speakers (via subsidies), the only 
fair way to jointly foot the bill of language acquisition, he hence proposes other 
mechanisms: poaching the web, and a ban on dubbing 36 . In that way, Non-
Anglophones would legitimately free-ride on the benefits of empirical English 
dominance.  
But Van Parijs is also committed to identity-related claims. He clearly combines 
these identity claims with democratic requisites, namely parity of esteem (a way of 
acknowledging the dignity of speakers), which he derives from Rawlsian principles: the 
“maximin principle” and “social support for self-respect” 37 , and which are best 
protected and achieved through linguistic territoriality. Every language should be “a 
Queen” in its own territory in order to minimize feelings of disparity of esteem 
																																																						
34   P. Van Parijs, Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2011, p. 31. 
35  It would be fastidious to go into the complicated details of the analysis which can be found in 
several of Van Parij’s articles: “Must Europe be Belgian ? On democratic citizenship in multilingual 
polities”, in C. McKinnon, I. Hampsher‐Monk, ed., The Demands of Citizenship, London & New York, 
Continuum, 2000, 235-253 ; “The Ground Floor of the World. On the Socioeconomic Consequences of 
Linguistic Globalization”, International Political Science Review, 21/2, 2000, 217‐233 “Linguistic 
Justice”, W. Kymlicka, A. Patten, ed., Language Rights and Political Theory, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2003, 153‐168; “L’anglais lingua franca de l’Union Européenne: impératif de solidarité, source 
d’injustice, facteur de déclin?”, Économie publique, 15, 2004, 13‐32;  ”Europe’s Three Language 
Problems” in, D. Castiglione, C. Longman, ed., The Challenges of Multilingualism in Law and Politics, 
Hart Publishers, 2006. 
36  P. Van Parijs, “Europe’s Linguistic Challenge”, European Journal of Sociology 45/1, 2004, 111-
152. 
37  On social support for self-respect: J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard, Harvard University 
Press, 1971, Ch. VII, Sect. 67, 386sq. ; Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 2005, Part 3, Lect. 
VIII, Sect. 6 pg. 318sq ; J. Rawls: Collected Papers, Edited by Samuel Freeman, Harvard, Harvard 
University Press, 1999, 361sq. 
On the maximin principle: A Theory of Justice, Harvard, Harvard University Press, 1971, Sect. 26-28. 
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experienced by (communities of) speakers who do not master English and whose 
languages are now in a lower position vis-à-vis English. Territorial language regimes 
provide language stability and language security (small languages are protected on their 
territory), and for territoriality to be efficient, it is mandatory that all speak the official 
language in its territory of reference. It is a coercive regime, the boundaries of which 
are to be decided upon by democratic procedures if its members collectively desire to 
claim territorial rights38. In this model, undoubtedly ingenious, a global demos capable 
of addressing global concerns in the same language (global justice) coexists with a 
variety of local demoi sensitive to the identity of individual speakers and communities. 
It is a combination of cooperation, coordination, efficiency and recognition.  
The main objections to Van Parijs’ model can be summarized under four headings.  
First, the territoriality principle in fact reproduces a rather classical nationalistic 
model of language rationalization within a territory (cujus regio, ejus lingua), 
unconvincing for principled reasons (how could we possibly defend global justice and 
argue in favor of territorial boundaries that are to a great extent arbitrary?39), but also for 
empirical reasons (there are more languages than territories, there are no unilingual 
territories, how should we deal with immigrant communities?). Second, the key role 
language plays in arguing speaker’s disparity of esteem, may be real, but the subjective 
feelings of humiliation, lack of recognition and even lack of autonomy are not 
necessarily the result of injustice or politically unfair practices40. Third, a global lingua 
																																																						
38  The procedures are not neatly spelled out but should ideally combine local unilingualisms (in 
order to protect small language communities) with a maximum incentive to learn and to use the lingua 
franca. 
39  See the ongoing debate about the « boundary problem » on the one hand, the debate on right to 
territory on the other hand. On the democratic illegitimacy of border control: A. Abizadeh, “Democratic 
Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control your Own Borders”, Political Theory 36-1, 
London, Sage, 2008, 37-65. On the question of affected interests in border control: R. Goodin, 
“Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 35/1, New York: 
Wiley, 2007, 40-68; on the right for nation states to exclude: D. Miller, “Justice in Immigration”, 
European Journal of Political Theory 14/4, London, Sage, 2013, 391-408; on the desirability and 
rationality of open borders: J. Carens, The Ethics of Immigration, Oxford Oxford University Press, 2013. 
On territorial rights and the legitimacy to claim territorial rights: M. Moore, A Political Theory of 
Territory, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015. On democratic citizenship and the self-government 
applied to border control: R. Bauböck, “Global Justice, Freedom of Movement and Democratic 
Citizenship”, European Journal of Sociology 50/1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1-31. 
40  As argued by A. Stilz, “Language, dignity, and territory”, H. de Schutter, D. Robichaud special 
issue guest ed., Linguistic Justice. Van Parijs and his Critics, Critical Review of International Social and 
Political Philosophy, 18/2, London, Routledge, 178-190. 
In “Bowling together. Lingua Franca and Social Multilingualism”, forthcoming in F. Grin, P. Kraus, ed., 
The Politics of Multilingualism: Linguistic Governance, Globalisation and Europeanisation, 
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franca as well as territorial language communities are not immune to power relations; 
neither in the coming about of language constellations (Anglo-American hegemonic 
culture and economy), nor in the perpetuation of linguistic inequalities or access to 
literacy for the least well off. Finally Van Parijs’ preference for coercive territorial 
regimes may end up being illiberal, despite the fact that territoriality theoretically 
depends on the collective desire of the speakers.  
The only solution – quite unrealistic in most places – would be to argue for a 
procedural model of language regimes, in which linguistic preferences are morally 
neutral: citizens would vote for their preferred language in a non-outcome oriented 
way, the state would be a minimalist benign neglect kind of entity (that would treat 
languages in much the same way as religion), and would display no (symbolic) 
preferences for any specific languages41. But as we have already pointed out, states 
speak, hands-off policies are hardly possible. And more importantly: what would the 
relevant constituency be? The recent debates in Spain have shown that the Catalonian 
vote in favor of Catalonian territoriality is – for many Castilian speakers within 
Catalonia - unjustifiable.  
 
The dividing line between those who argue in favor of identity-related claims and 
efficiency-related claims – and I have shown that most scholars assume that ethical 
policies must in some way combine the two elements - is maybe less between a 
specific awareness regarding dignity, parity of esteem and social support for self respect 
on the one hand, and political-democratic (and budgetary) efficiency on the other 
hand. I would like to suggest that an alternative reading looks at language burden. In a 
nutshell: either small and vulnerable languages are a burden for their speakers 
(exclusion, non participation, symbolic and material costs of learning the lingua franca, 
humiliation, disparity of esteem), or they are not: they are simply an arbitrary result of 
birthplace, but need not be conceived as a burden, and may even offer opportunities in 
coordinated language policies.  
																																																																																																																																																																									
Amsterdam,  John Benjamins, 2016, I offer a different account, relying on social multilingualism in 
relevant spheres and co-presence of different English repertoires (World English).  
41  D. Laitin and R. Reich, “A liberal democratic approach to language justice”, in W. Kymlicka, A. 
Patten, Language Rights and Political Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, 80-104. 
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Small and vulnerable languages are a burden, much like socio-economic 
endowments are morally arbitrary, therefore they need to be compensated (through 
equalizing costs of learning, territoriality, a Rawlsian difference principle). This is what 
most authors recommend: managing the burden through institutions and practices in 
the light of desirable democratic requisites. a) By learning languages upwards and 
switching into the bigger language 42 , b) by conferring rights to small language 
communities43, c) by encouraging a lingua franca alongside territorially protected small 
languages44, or d) a combination of the above.  
If we agree on my premise that language policies are the substructure for other 
democratic requirements, we need to explain the exact nature of the burden in order to 
find out how to fix it. Yet most scholars fail to explain the nature of the burden: 
different burdens call for different policy answers. Note that none of the options below 
excludes a lingua franca regime, but maybe not of the kind Van Parijs has in mind. I 
will proceed by conceptual couples. 
If the burden is on equality and democratic participation, the policy answer should 
be equalizing situations, opportunities, and encouraging equal participation. Is this 
possible only in the lingua franca plus territoriality model? One may argue that 
democratic participation (local or global) is not necessarily determined by linguistic 
skills, although a common language is desirable. Firstly social multilingualism as well 
as groups of multilingual social translators may do the job45. Secondly, citizens can 
participate and have access to social and political services in their language and (an 
idiosyncratic variety of) English. “World English”46 would be then be an alternative to 
																																																						
42  A. de Swaan, Words of the World, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001. 
43  W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2001; S. May, Language and Minority Rights. Ethnicity, Nationalism and the 
Politics of Language (2nd Edition), New York/London, Routledge, 2012; P. Van Parijs, Linguistic Justice 
for Europe and for the World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011; D. Réaume, “Official Language 
Rights: Intrinsic Value and the Protection of Difference”, Kymlicka, Will Wayne Norman, ed., Citizenship 
in Diverse Societies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
44  P. Van Parijs, Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2011. 
45  Focusing on bilingual speakers, relying on willing translators and the cognitive flexibility of 
speakers. This proviso is meant to prevent embarrassing situations, in other words to support self respect, 
and to prevent arbitrariness: every language has equal weight. See my “Bowling together”, art. cit. 
46  R. M. Bhatt, 2001: “World Englishes”, Annual Review of Anthropology, 30, 2001, 527-550; B. B. 
Kachru: “World Englishes and English Using Communities”, Annual Review of Applied Linguistics, vol. 
17, 1997, 66-87; J. Jenkins “English as lingua franca: interpretations and attitudes”, World Englishes, 
28/2, 2009, 200-207; C. Mair, ed., The Politics of English as a World Language, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 
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English as a lingua franca47. World English has no real center (neither the UK nor the 
US is such a center, and therefore neither the UK nor the US are hegemonic providers 
of language related culture); it is a “hybrid” language48 with very little a priori norms49; 
it is contextual, situational, and dynamic. It is also universal in the sense that every 
speaker has to learn it – even, to a certain extent, native speakers of norm-English, 
because of the amount of idiosyncrasies50: there are hence as many languages as 
speakers. World English is a multilingual, sui generis language and would fix, in part at 
least, asymmetric language situations. Thirdly, linguistic disadvantages can be fixed, 
either instrumentally by providing translation services, incentives, or more substantially 
by offering a proper language training that “grants equal access to democratic 
opportunity”51 without hindering recognition and parity of esteem. Lastly, there are 
many ways to be informed and to participate in other languages than the official or 
common one. Poaching the web and the ban on dubbing are not compensating tools, 
they actually only speed the spread of English as a lingua franca. The reverse - put as 
much information in your own language on the world wide web - may have more 
felicitous effects. 
 
If the burden is on autonomy and liberty, the answer is different. For individuals, 
autonomy is supposed to heavily rely on language skills, firstly because in enables them 
to make significant life choices within a community with whom they share a (verbal 
																																																																																																																																																																									
2003; S. May, “The problem with English(es) and linguistic (in)justice. Addressing the limits of liberal 
egalitarian accounts of language », in H. de Schutter, D. Robichaud special issue guest ed., Linguistic 
Justice. Van Parijs and his Critics, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 18/2, 
2015, 131-148. 
Many language scholars believe this is a naïve approach as “World English” – in the end – reenacts the 
same power structures as plain English. 
47  S. May, “The problem with English(es) and linguistic (in)justice. Addressing the limits of liberal 
egalitarian accounts of language”, in H. de Schutter, D. Robichaud special issue guest ed., Linguistic 
Justice. Van Parijs and his Critics, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 18/2, 
2015, 131-148. 
48  S. Canagarajah, “Lingua Franca English, Multilingual Communities, and Language Acquisition”, 
The Modern Language Journal, 91, Focus Issue, 2007, 924-939. 
49  J. House, “English as lingua franca: A threat to multilingualism?”, Journal of Sociolinguistics, 7/4, 
2003, 556-578. 
House, 2003 
50  A. Firth, “The discursive accomplishment of normality. On ‘lingua franca’ English and 
conversation analysis”, Journal of Pragmatics, 26, 1996, 237-259. 
51  A. Shorten, “Linguistic Competence and Citizenship Acquisition”, in G. Calder, P. Cole, J. 
Seglow, ed., Citizenship Acquisition and National Belonging. Migration, Membership and the Liberal 
Democratic State, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010, 117-18. 
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and non-verbal) understanding of the identity of their community, and secondly 
because access to the social, the political, and the market spheres are dependent on the 
ability to communicate with the relevant offices and administrations, and to claim 
rights. For language communities, autonomy serves different purposes: it is rather about 
sharing and protecting a political public culture (carried by a specific language), and 
setting the grounds for self-government within a mutually intelligible context of debate 
and decision-making. Autonomy is hence an identity-related claim and a tool for 
efficient democratic government. But in the identity version, it is because individual 
speakers claim recognition that states should (territorially) accommodate them. In the 
democratic efficiency version (Rainer Bauböck’s “stakeholder model” for example52), 
individual language rights are not the building blocks for territorial language regimes, it 
is rather because of the collective value people assign to their languages that (territorial) 
linguistic regimes are the result of self-governing powers to alter, influence and shift 
language preferences. Which means that specific demoi should have the right, for 
democratic self-governing reasons, to design their language policies in the way they 
deem fit and fair. Note that a common language is neither a necessary or sufficient 
resource for self-government, nor for lively democratic deliberation53. Self-government 
is the independent variable (language the tool), whereas language (as an identity 
marker) is the dependent variable 54 . Therefore the burden on autonomy justifies 
coercive territorial regimes only in so far as coercion is the result of democratic self-
government55. And, caeteris paribus, the burden on autonomy justifies lingua franca 
regimes only in so far as autonomous self-governing polities have an equal say in 
designing the global regime. But this is obviously empirically untrue. Language 
communities are not equal partners in designing global regimes: industrialized 
countries with high numbers of literacy, a good educational system with language 
training, and skilled workers are clearly ahead of all the others. In other words, if the 
																																																						
52  R. Bauböck, “Morphing the Demos into the right shape. Normative principles for Enfranchizing 
Resident Aliens and Expatriate Citizens”, Democratization 22/5, 2015, 820-839. 
53  This would caeteris paribus contradict the argument that a global lingua franca fosters global 
democracy, or, to a lesser extent, global justice. 
54  B. Boudou, A. von Busekist, “Language proficiency and migration: An argument against testing”, 
forthcoming in M. Gazzola, B.A. Wickström, T. Templin, Language Policy and Linguistic Justice: 
Economics, Philosophical and Sociolinguistics Approaches, Berlin, Spinger, 2017. 
55  D. Weinstock, “Can parity of self-esteem serve as the basis of the principle of linguistic 
territoriality?”, in H. de Schutter, D. Robichaud special issue guest ed., Linguistic Justice. Van Parijs and 
his Critics, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 18/2, 2015, 199-211 
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burden is on autonomy, the burden needs to be referred to the relevant spheres and to 
the relevant constituencies. 
 
If the burden is on diversity, non-domination (and exclusion), the answer is different 
still. If language diversity is a value, then diversity should be upheld by all means (as in 
the EU for example, where “equal respect [is] due to all cultures and languages”56), 
regardless of the efficiency model, and regardless of its consequences on domination 
and exclusion. If diversity is not valued per se but is expected to be traded-off against 
mutually intelligible common languages or a lingua franca, then the lingua franca 
model plus territorial or personal arrangements may be the best option. Van Parijs is 
indeed ready to give up local diversity for inter-local diversity. But is territoriality plus 
lingua franca really the best answer to combat exclusion and to foster global justice? 
Language economists have convincingly shown that the reduction in the number of 
official languages in the EU (e.g. 24) would a) exclude a vast amount of citizens from 
access to EU politics, b) be detrimental to the least well off, e.g. the most vulnerable 
social groups and the weakest members in terms of language skills, and c) that “that the 
current full multilingual policy of the EU, based on translation and interpreting, is not 
only the most effective language policy among the alternative options usually put 
forward in the literature; it is also (and it will be for the foreseeable future) the only one 
that is truly inclusive”57. If that is so, there is no reason to give up diversity for 
																																																						
56  Decision No 1934/2000/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2000 on 
the European Year of Languages 2001, retrieved here: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/GA/TXT/?uri=celex:32000D1934 
57  M. Gazzola, “Language Policy and Linguistic Justice in the European Union: The Socio-
Economic Effects of Multilingualism”, ELF Working Papers Series, #15, www.elf.unige.ch.  
Others argue that the self-fulfilling prophecy of English as a lingua franca is fundamentally flawed. 
English is neither the language of international politics and higher education (this contradicts Van Parijs’ 
“brain drain” – “ground floor of the world” argument, see P. Van Parijs Philippe, 2000a: “The Ground 
Floor of the World. On the Socioeconomic Consequences of Linguistic Globalization”, International 
Political Science Review, 21/2, 217-233), nor the world language: only 14% of EU citizens speak English, 
only 21% master English on a “fairly good level” as a second language in the Member states, and only 
7% to 8% of the world population speaks English. 
See M. Gazzola, “The linguistic implications of academic performance indicators: general trends and 
case study”, International Journal of the Sociology of Language, n° 216, 2012, 131-156; M. Gazzol, F. 
Grin, “Is ELF more effective and fair than translation? An evaluation of the EU’s multilingual regime”, 
International Journal of Applied Linguistics, 23 / 1, 2013, 93–107; F. Grin, “Dépasser les idées recues”, Le 
Débat n° 178, janvier-février 2014, 127-135;  M. Laforest, G. Breton, D. Bell ed., 2014: Réflexions sur 
l'internationalisation du monde universitaire. Points de vue d'acteurs. Cahier n° 1 du RIMES, Paris: 
Éditions des archives contemporaines, 2014. 
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inclusionary and non-domination reasons, and there is no reason at all to adopt a 
lingua franca “for Europe and the world”58. 
Language burdens are in reality opportunities in this approach. And the relevant 
question is not how we should compensate the least well off linguistically while sharing 
global concerns and encouraging global justice in a global language, but how to best 
resist a normative claim that is not empirically fully worked out. 
 
I have shown that linguistic justice scholars work with the notion of burden on small 
and vulnerable languages, but that they do not always disentangle the nature of the 
burden and hence the political and normative conclusions that flow from the type of 
burden one is concerned with. 
 
Conclusion: political language policies 
 
I will conclude by arguing firstly that the literature is not always clear about the 
political preferences that inspire normative prescriptions for language policies. Just 
language policies are not necessarily democratic language policies. Democratic 
policies are not equivalent to liberal or republican language policies: they have 
different normative starting points. Secondly, I believe that there is no one all-
encompassing, normative answer to the challenges of linguistic diversity. The best 
solution is, as often, a second-best solution, mindful of different empirical situations 
and existing political regimes, power structures, and sensitivity to “politics against 
domination”59. 
The question then is rather which legitimate political principle or which policy-
outcome is best served by the different approaches to linguistic justice or ethical 
language policies in specific locations. 
 
As I have argued the literature can be usefully organized according to the value 
authors confer to either identity or political efficiency or a combination of both60. Say 
																																																						
58  P. Van Paris, Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2011. 
59  Ian Shapiro, Politics against domination, Harvard, Harvard University Press, 2016. 
60  This is a very classical way of ordering the literature. 
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identity is important but should be acknowledged in one way or another by political 
efficiency. No regime respectful of individual rights and democratic constitutionalism 
can disregard identity (e.g. the quest for recognition and parity of esteem: in seeking 
respect, dissenters convey that their private preferences are indeed the business of the 
community).  
If we now cross these two principles with political preferences (liberalism, 
democracy, republicanism, nationalism), what kind of policies do we get?  
We have argued that it is a) illiberal to secure or sustain languages (and hence 
language communities) without the explicit consent of their members61; b) that it is non 
democratic to impose coercive territorial language regimes without the consent of the 
relevant constituency 62 ; c) that it runs against the non-domination principle that 
individuals should be coerced into learning a language they do not wish to learn; d) 
that it is desirable for economic and political reasons (employability, mobility, 
integration of migrants) that people speak a common language within a given territory; 
e) that it is desirable for a democratic polity to function with a maximum amount of 
participation: the demos designs the laws, the demos is the author of the laws, therefore 
the laws are legitimate and justifiable to everyone; e) that positive liberty but also 
(liberal) nationalism requires that demoi identify with their polity (shared public culture, 
solidarity, belonging), and therefore must uphold, or be committed to, a public sphere 
that is intelligible for all; f) that a global lingua franca enhances awareness of global 
injustice, encourages a global civil society, lessens inequality of opportunities and 
global exclusion63. 
If you are a liberal egalitarian, you would go for non-coercive territorial protection 
plus a regime of multiple linguae francae; if you are a utilitarian liberal you would opt 
either for the territorial or the personality principle combined with a lingua franca 
regime; if you are a liberal or a cultural nationalist, you would opt for acknowledging 
																																																						
61  Contra R. Phillipson, “Lingua Franca or lingua frankensteinia? English in European integration 
and globalization”, World Englishes, vol. 27/2, 2008, 250-267; “English as threat or opportunity in 
European higher education”, 2013, retrieved here http://www. researchgate. 
net/publication/265794097_English_as_threat_or_opportunity_i n_European_higher_education.   
62  R. Bauböck, “The political value of languages”, in in H. de Schutter, D. Robichaud special issue 
guest ed., Linguistic Justice. Van Parijs and his Critics, Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy, 18/2, 2015, 212–223. 
63  D. Archibugi, M. Cellini, “Democracy and Global Governance. The Internal and External 
Levers”, IRPPS Working paper 69/2015. 
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and protecting diversity via language rights for vulnerable historical communities, the 
personality principle and a combination of linguae francae; if you are a nationalist, you 
would go for coercive territoriality, a non-coercive and non encouraged lingua franca 
regime; if you are a democrat, you would opt for the procedural model: self-
government and autonomy in designing language policies (most probably a territoriality 
of consent); a lingua franca regime would be acceptable only under the same 
conditions of global consent between demoi; if you are a republican, you would go for 
any options that prevent domination (territoriality, self-government, equal recognition, 
equal opportunities, possibly an additional lingua franca regime for utilitarian reasons); 
if you are a liberal committed to global justice and parity of esteem (this seems to be a 
sui generis category), you will opt for coercive territoriality and a encourage English as 
a lingua franca; if you are an illiberal ecologist, you would protect diversity at all costs, 
regardless of the desire of speakers.  
This is an analytical and probably too systematic way of ordering preferences. But it 
does show that a combination of a global language (English) and (coercive) territoriality 
is only one way of designing ethical language policies. The trade-off between 
territoriality (versus diversity 64 ) and a lingua franca (versus global injustice and 
domination) is not satisfying without more empirical evidence and without a clear 
statement about the burdens we wish to alleviate within a hierarchy of given political 
preferences.  
 
In short, different types of political or moral desiderata (autonomy, liberty, non-
domination, security, self-government, mobility, employability) call for different 
justifications of language policies and design different language constellations. I believe 
that non-coercive territorial regimes (even if they may empirically promote majority 
languages), combined with a set of lingua francae is the best solution. People should 
have a say in their linguistic preferences and collectively decide on the minority 
languages they wish to protect domestically on the one hand, and they should be able 
to freely chose the language or the languages they would like to learn for global, inter-
regional communication on the other hand.  
																																																						
64  P. Van Parijs, “Linguistic diversity as curse and as by-product”, in Respecting Linguistic Diversity 




This solution has the following advantages: The language constellation (in the EU 
and globally) would remain dynamic : a) English is not the only European/ global lingua 
franca, and if we refrain from actively encouraging English, there is a chance that other 
languages acquire the same status English enjoys today; and b) as people are free in 
their language choices, the language combinations of each individual, and of each 
polity collectively, encourage aggregate diversity without hindering international 
communication. 
The constellation would also be fairer because it would exclude less individuals (see 
the European data65). It would lastly be advantageous for intra – and extra-European 
communication: people need to master other languages than English in order to sustain 
a global and free system of linguistic exchanges. Coordination policies within the EU, 
or within regional institutions would be able to decide on working languages relevant 
for their respective constituencies while guaranteeing inter-regional connections. 




65  M. Gazzola, “Language Policy and Linguistic Justice in the European Union: The Socio-
Economic Effects of Multilingualism”, ELF Working Papers Series, #15, www.elf.unige.ch. 
